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LEGITIMIZING THE ICC: SUPPORTING 
THE COURT’S PROSECUTION OF THOSE 
RESPONSIBLE IN DARFUR 
Mary T. Reynolds* 
Abstract: The conflict in Darfur is one of the world’s worst humanitarian 
disasters. The fact that the Sudanese government, including its current 
sitting head of state, played a critical role in orchestrating the murder, 
rape, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in the region 
makes the violence perpetrated in this region particularly egregious. In 
an effort to address these problems, the U.N. Security Council referred 
the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC). After its investiga-
tion, the ICC granted an arrest warrant for President Bashir, which 
charged him with crimes against humanity. Under the Rome Treaty, the 
U.N. Security Council can delay prosecution of President Bashir indefi-
nitely, and certain sectors of the international community are pressuring 
it to do just that. Those that support the delay fear that allowing the 
prosecution to move forward will derail potential peace negotiations and 
result in more violence in the country. To support their contention, they 
cited threats made by the Sudanese government to escalate attacks. While 
the U.N. must address these threats, delaying prosecution is the wrong so-
lution. This Note argues that allowing threats of violence to derail the 
pursuit of justice could irreparably damage the court’s international 
reputation and credibility. To bolster the legitimacy of the ICC, 
strengthen international criminal justice, and deter future leaders from 
following President Bashir’s destructive example, the U.N. and the rest of 
the international community must support the ICC in its apprehension of 
President Bashir and support the court in holding him accountable for 
his crimes. 
Introduction 
Since January 2008, more than 230,000 civilians [from Darfur] have been 
forced to flee violence, at a rate of nearly 1,000 per day. Many of them have 
fled to overcrowded camps near large towns or in some cases sought shelter in 
the desert until clashes subsided. As attacks on humanitarian agencies also 
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continue[] to climb, incidents of violence against aid workers in the first eight 
months of 2008 have already surpassed the total records in 2007. 
—Report of United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon1 
[E]ven in Darfur, you can say most of it is safe. There are no problems and 
life is very normal. 
—Sudanese President Omar al Bashir2 
 The conflict in Darfur has resulted in one of the most atrocious 
humanitarian disasters the international community has witnessed.3 
Erupting in 2003, the armed conflict between the Sudanese govern-
ment forces and local militia called “Janjaweed,” against rebel factions 
known as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement ( JEM), caused the destruction of hundreds of vil-
lages, tens of thousands of civilian deaths, the displacement of millions 
of people, and assaults of thousands of women and girls.4 Although the 
international community has been slow to respond to the crisis, the 
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council made history when it referred 
the conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation 
on March 31, 2005.5 The ICC is a treaty-based institution resulting from 
the Rome Statute enacted on July 17, 1998.6 This is the first time that 
the U.N. Security Council has referred a matter to the ICC.7 The three 
other referrals to the ICC since its inception were state initiated.8 As 
                                                                                                                      
1 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Un-
ion—United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, ¶ 60, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2008/659 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
2 Channel 4 News: Sudan President: No Mass Rape (BBC Channel 4 television broadcast 
Oct. 9, 2008). 
3 See Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur—Savior or Spoiler?, 14 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
145, 146 (2007). 
4 Human Rights Watch, Q & A: Crisis in Darfur, Hum. Rts. Watch News, Apr. 25, 
2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/25/q-crisis-darfur. 
5 See Kastner, supra note 3, at 146, 161; Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Su-
dan? Darfur in the International Criminal Court, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 1–2 (2005); 
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
6 See Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, The Road to Rome and Beyond: Key 
Moments in the Establishment of the International Criminal Court a Timeline 
of the Establishment and Work of the International Criminal Court 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC_Timeline_updated_0708.pdf. 
7 See Udombana, supra note 5, at 2. 
8 Id. In December 2003, the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army was re-
ferred to the ICC Prosecutor by Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni. See id. In early 2004, 
the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo referred crimes committed in the 
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opposed to the cases where the state itself initiated a referral to the 
ICC, the Government of Sudan has continuously refused to cooperate 
with the ICC or even to fully acknowledge the extent of the problems.9 
 The ICC made history when Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo re-
quested a warrant for the arrest of Sudan’s President, Omar Bashir, on 
July 14, 2008.10 This is the first time that the court has pursued the ar-
rest of a sitting head of state, as well as the first time that the court has 
sought an indictment for genocide, the most serious of all international 
crimes.11 In response to the warrant request, the Sudanese government 
proclaimed threats of violence.12 Despite these threats, and after 
months of deliberation, the ICC formally ordered the arrest of Presi-
dent Bashir on March 4, 2009.13 The President was charged with war 
crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in the atrocities in Dar-
fur.14 The court did not, however, charge the President with genocide 
as originally requested by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo.15 In retaliation 
                                                                                                                      
territory of DRC to the ICC Prosecutor. See id. Also, in January 2005, the Government of 
the Central African Republic referred crimes to the ICC. See id. 
9 See Channel 4 News, supra note 2 (noting Bashir’s denial of mass rape and his claim 
that the charges of genocide and crimes against humanity were fabricated); Letter from 
Justice for Darfur Campaign to the U.N. Security Council: Insist on Justice for Darfur, 
(May 29, 2008) (on file with Human Rights Watch) (noting the Sudanese government’s 
public refusal to cooperate with the court in surrendering two suspects with outstanding 
arrest warrants issued by the ICC for crimes in Darfur). 
10 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, but Others Can Expect to Follow, Economist, July 19, 2008, 
at 55 [hereinafter Sudan’s Leader Is Accused]; Human Rights Watch, Q & A: International 
Criminal Court’s Action Against al-Bashir, Hum. Rts. Watch News, July 14, 2008, http:// 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/02/q-international-criminal-court-s-action-against-al-bashir. 
11 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
12 See Andrew Heavens, Sudan Says Indicting President Would Risk Bloodshed, Reuters, 
Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSL5223746. 
13 See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Warrant Issued for Sudanese Leader over Darfur 
War Crimes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2009, at A6; Arrest the President, Economist.com, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13217676&source 
=features_box_main. 
14 See Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13. 
15 See id. The court found insufficient data to support a charge of genocide. See id.; De-
mocracy Now!: HRW’s Richard Dicker and Scholar, Mediator Alex de Waal Debate International 
Criminal Court Indictment of Sudanese President for Mass Killings in Darfur (Democracy Now! 
radio and television broadcast Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Democracy 
Now!]. The question of whether to include a charge of genocide was controversial, but the 
judges ultimately ruled 2 to 1 that Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo “had not provided suffi-
cient evidence of the president’s specific intent to ‘destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group,’ the most crucial issue in determining genocide.” 
Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13 (quoting the ICC’s decision on the warrant for 
Bashir). The prosecutor had argued that the killing and displacement of three ethnic 
groups—the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups—amounted to genocide and that this cam-
paign continued in refugee camps through the assault of these ethnic women. See id. The 
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to the issuance of the arrest warrant, Sudanese officials expelled many 
Western aid groups.16 
 These threats of violence and retaliatory tactics by the Sudanese 
government against humanitarian agencies have instigated the familiar 
debate in international criminal justice between justice and peace.17 
Those that support the ICC’s decision contend that allowing impunity 
for these horrific crimes will encourage other murderous regimes, 
while others argue that indicting a sitting Sudanese President will de-
stroy all hope of fostering peace negotiations to end the violence.18 
                                                                                                                      
term genocide was also used by former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell during a high 
profile testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 9, 2004. See 
Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide 140, 157 (2005). Additionally, for-
mer President George W. Bush similarly stated: “Our conclusion is that a genocide is un-
derway in Darfur.” See id. at 157. Despite this, Alex de Waal, a Harvard scholar and former 
advisor to the African Union mediation team for the Darfur conflict, noted that “about 
150 people are being killed every month in Darfur. And that’s bad. . . . But that does not 
amount to an ongoing genocide.” Democracy Now!, supra. In response, Richard Dicker, Di-
rector of Human Rights Watch’s International Justice Program, contended that while Hu-
man Rights Watch also has not found genocide, “widespread or systematic murder, torture 
or rape doesn’t amount to a parking violation[]. . . . These are the most serious crimes 
under [the] law. So I wouldn’t make too much of the fact while the prosecutor wanted 
genocide charges, the court has found crimes against humanity, which are, again, torture, 
murder, rape, on a widespread basis, committed as part of a plan.” Id. The charge for 
genocide could be reinstated, however, with more evidence. See Braced for the Aftershock, 
Economist, Mar. 5, 2009, at 66. 
16 See Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13. Within hours after the ICC issued the arrest 
warrant, ten international agencies that provide humanitarian care for the people of Darfur 
received letters from the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
informing them that their licenses to work in Sudan had been revoked. See Human Rights 
Watch, Sudan: Expelling Aid Agencies Harms Victims, Hum. Rts. Watch News, Mar. 5, 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/05/sudan-expelling-aid-agencies-harms-victims. The 
ten agencies include Oxfam, Medecins sans Frontieres, Save the Children, CARE, and the 
International Rescue Committee. Id. The same evening that these organizations received the 
letters, HAC officials began seizing property from these agencies’ offices in both Darfur and 
Khartoum, including phones and computers. Id. “Despite assurances from Sudanese authori-
ties over recent months, including HAC, that they would continue to facilitate the work of 
humanitarian agencies, it appears the expulsions were planned well in advance of the war-
rant being issued.” Id. One aid official speaking anonymously stated: “It happened right after 
the announcement. The connection was clear.” Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13. The 
Sudanese government has often accused aid organizations of supporting the ICC by provid-
ing the court with data and testimony that has then been used to build a case against the 
government. Id. 
17 See Kastner, supra note 3, at 146, 149; Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
As Alex de Waal put it, “Now, yes, we all support justice, but can justice be pursued at the 
expense of withdrawing essential humanitarian support that keep millions of people alive? 
. . . And so, my question is not should there be accountability, but should accountability, in 
its timing, in its process, be weighed against other considerations?” Democracy Now!, supra 
note 15. 
18 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
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 Regardless of the viewpoint taken, the ICC is finding itself in a po-
sition to drastically affect the outcome of an ongoing international con-
flict.19 Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
two other international judicial bodies charged with prosecuting war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the ICC has the poten-
tial to exact punishments in the midst of a crisis as opposed to being 
limited to imposing ex post facto justice only.20 Furthermore, even 
though domestic courts have been created by Sudan, these are criti-
cized as ineffective and unjust, proving that the ICC is greatly needed 
to deal with the ongoing atrocities.21 
 Due to the magnitude of the conflict and the historic precedent 
that this case presents, the legitimacy and power of the fledgling ICC is 
on the line.22 Following the warrant requests by Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo, the U.N. Security Council faced pressure by some organiza-
tions to postpone the indictment of President Bashir.23 Under Article 
16 of the Rome Treaty, the Security Council has the power to postpone 
an indictment for up to a year, with indefinite renewal, if there is a 
threat to international security.24 The decision that the United Nations 
Security Council makes has the potential to solidify the importance of 
the ICC as a deterrent factor for future leaders or to undermine the 
importance and power of the court.25 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Kastner, supra note 3, at 146. 
20 See id. at 146, 147, 152, 154 (arguing that “[b]oth tribunals, in particular the ICTY, 
have produced an important amount of case law, thus advancing international criminal 
law significantly. . . . [but] were, however, ineffective or else came too late to influence the 
conflict whilst the atrocities were being committed”). 
21 See More than 100 to Face Sham Courts in Sudan, Austl. Amnesty Int’l, Aug. 19, 
2008, http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/16552/; Human Rights Watch, Sudan: 
End Sham Trials by Anti-Terror Courts, Hum. Rts. Watch News, Aug. 6, 2008, http:// 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/06/sudan-end-sham-trials-anti-terror-courts; infra notes 
102–115 and accompanying text. In July 2008, thirty alleged members of the rebel group 
JEM were sentenced to death for their supposed role in an attack on the capital Khartoum 
in May of that same year. See Human Rights Watch, supra. Some of the defendants were 
given only limited access to lawyers, denied the right to see evidence against them, and 
complained of the use of torture to extract confessions. Id. 
22 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
23 See id. 
24 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with un-
der this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court 
to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”); 
Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
25 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
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 By referring the case of Darfur to the ICC, the U.N. Security 
Council acknowledged the magnitude of the crisis in Darfur and sent 
the message that the international community will not allow such injus-
tice to go unpunished. If the prosecution of President Bashir is delayed, 
the future effectiveness of the ICC, a potentially critical vehicle in the 
fight for international criminal justice, could be destroyed. While the 
states that have ratified the Rome Treaty must support the apprehen-
sion of President Bashir, as the referring party, the members of the 
U.N. need to join these states and support the prosecution of President 
Bashir. 
 Using Darfur as a case study, this Note argues that, while it is im-
portant to consider the potential problems that accompany the indict-
ment and prosecution of a sitting leader, the U.N. Security Council 
should not delay the trial but rather should support the ICC and seek 
to facilitate justice. Part I of this Note gives a brief history of the conflict 
in Darfur, focusing on the role of the Sudanese government in the 
perpetration of crimes against humanity. Part II chronicles the forma-
tion of the ICC and its role in the conflict in Darfur thus far, and ex-
plains the reasons the court is both unique and vital to the advance-
ment of international criminal justice. Part III discusses why the ICC is 
especially needed in Sudan given the failure of the Sudanese govern-
ment to end the crisis or to create effective domestic courts. Part IV 
addresses arguments as to why the U.N. Security Council should invoke 
Article 16 and delay prosecution, and counters with reasons the U.N. 
should support immediate prosecution. Ultimately this Note surmises 
that the U.N. Security Council and all U.N. members must help enforce 
the arrest of President Bashir, in order to give credibility to the ICC, 
promote justice in Darfur, and deter future leaders from promulgating 
crimes against humanity. 
I. The Conflict in Darfur 
 The country of Sudan has been ravaged by civil war intermittently 
for several decades.26 The government has been fighting this conflict 
on two major fronts.27 The first divides the Arab Muslims, who control 
the North, the policymaking center of the Khartoum government, and 
                                                                                                                      
26 Ted Dagne, Cong. Research Serv., Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, 
Terrorism, and U.S. Policy 1 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
IB98043.pdf. The Sudanese conflict has been Africa’s longest lasting civil war. Id. 
27 See Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: 
A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 182, 188 (2006). 
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the African Christians and animists in the south, who have been largely 
ignored by the government.28 The second conflict has been in the Dar-
fur region in the western part of the country.29 
 The conflict in Darfur escalated in February 2003 when the JEM 
and the SLA began attacking government installations and accusing the 
Sudanese government of discriminating against African ethnic groups 
in the region.30 Up until this point, the Sudanese government viewed 
the formation of a peace agreement with the South as its main focus 
and had largely ignored the problems in Darfur.31 Using the turmoil of 
the government and mounting international pressure to end the 
North-South conflict to their advantage, the SLA and JEM were able to 
gain the upper hand in the initial phases of the conflict.32 
 Once the Sudanese government realized that the rebel groups 
were beginning to organize themselves in a far more threatening way 
than before, it decided to arm an already existing Arab militia—the 
Janjaweed—to crush the rebel insurrection.33 Under the direction of 
government forces, the Janjaweed “unleashed a campaign of terror 
against civilians [in Darfur].”34 These attacks by the Sudanese govern-
ment and Janjaweed forces have resulted in horrendous destruction 
                                                                                                                      
28 See id. Racial differences between the Arabs and the Africans have played a large role 
in the conflict in Darfur. See Prunier, supra note 15, at 162–65. The Darfur region has 
been criticized as being poor and backward because it is “insufficiently Arabized.” Id. at 
162. The famine of 1984 served to further highlight the dichotomy between a sedentary 
Arab community and the nomadic African groups, with the Arabs viewed as good and the 
lifestyle of the African groups seen as bad. See id. at 162. 
29 See Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 188. Darfur in the 1990s was “an increasingly mar-
ginalized, violent and frustrated place.” Prunier, supra note 15, at 81. This marginalization 
of the area has occurred through successive governments since the British conquered the 
country in 1916. Agnes Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven et al., Explaining Darfur: Lec-
tures on the Ongoing Genocide 10 (Vossiuspers Uva 2007). This marginalization was 
particularly criticized during the famine of 1984 during which 100,000 people died. See 
Prunier, supra note 15, at 56; Kastner, supra note 3, at 155–56. 
30 See Dagne, supra note 26, at 2. 
31 See Prunier, supra note 15, at 81. “[A] certain ‘acceptable’ level of violence in the 
Western province had been routine, and nobody was very worried by ‘normal’ killings.” Id. 
at 92. 
32See Dagne, supra note 26, at 2. Those providing support to the SLA include busi-
nessmen in Darfur and officers and soldiers in the Sudanese army. See id. The Sudanese 
government has also accused the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army of providing 
support to the SLA. See id. 
33 See Dagne, supra note 26, at CRS-3; Prunier, supra note 15, at 92, 97–98. The Jan-
jaweed “had existed since the late 1980s in an underterminate zone half-way between ban-
dits and government thugs.” Prunier, supra note 15, at 97. 
34 See Dagne, supra note 26, at 3. 
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and violence.35 As of April 2008, approximately 2.5 million displaced 
people lived in refugee camps in Darfur and more than 200,000 people 
had sought refuge in neighboring Chad.36 The U.N. stated that the 
death toll may now have reached 300,000 in just five years.37 
 While the battle was once a straightforward conflict between the 
Sudanese army and the Janjaweed, against the two main rebel groups, 
JEM and SLA, “the nature of the conflict in Darfur has mutated, mak-
ing the violence more unpredictable and widespread and the task of 
getting a lasting peace deal that much harder.”38 This is a result of the 
Janjaweed militias breaking into smaller factions that have begun fight-
ing amongst themselves and even sometimes against the Sudanese 
army, particularly in response to the government’s failure to pay 
them.39 The JEM and SLA rebel groups have also fragmented into 
about thirty groups of various sizes that have attacked those aid workers 
helping their own communities.40 
 The violence in the region has severely hampered humanitarian 
efforts to aid the increasing problems in Darfur.41 On January 1, 2008, 
a hybrid force combining the U.N. and African Union, known as the 
African Union/U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), formally 
took over peacekeeping authority.42 Due to obstructions set in place by 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 4. Traditional attacks begin with air raids fol-
lowed by the arrival of militiamen who loot the villages, rape the women, burn the houses, 
and shoot anyone who can not run away. See Prunier, supra note 15, at 99–100. These 
attacks have been viewed as a form of ethnic cleansing, pitting the Arab Janjaweed against 
the African civilians. See id. at 100; Human Rights Watch, supra note 4. The targets of the 
Sudanese military and militia forces were overwhelmingly those “sharing the ethnicity of 
or geographic proximity to the two main rebel movements.” See Human Rights Watch, 
Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in 
Darfur 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur 
1205webwcover.pdf. Those ethnic groups were initially the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa, but 
has expanded to include other non-Arab tribes. See id. at 7. 
36 Human Rights Watch, supra note 4. The camps for these refugees are full. Save Dar-
fur, Darfur Update 2 (2008), available at http://darfur.3cdn.net/46c257b8e3959746d5_ 
ttm6bnau2.pdf. For example, there is an official capacity of 14,000 at the Al-Salam, a camp in 
South Darfur. Id. The numbers of those housed there steadily rose in the year 2007 from 
3500 in January, to 13,300 in March, to 33,000 in early July. Id. By June 2008, the number had 
risen to 51,000. Id. Additionally, civilians and aid workers are regularly harassed and robbed 
by gunmen. Id. 
37 See Save Darfur, supra note 36, at 1; Edith M. Lederer, UN Says Darfur Conflict Wors-
ening, with Perhaps 300,000 Dead, Associated Press, Apr. 22, 2008. 
38 See A Gleam Among the Ruins, Economist, Nov. 20, 2008, at 33–34. 
39 See id. at 34. 
40 See id. 
41 See Save Darfur, supra note 36, at 3–4; Human Rights Watch, supra note 4. 
42 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 4. 
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the Sudanese government, however, by April 2008 the force was “barely 
one third of its authorized strength.”43 Furthermore, attacks against 
humanitarian aid workers have been on the rise since 2006.44 
 Despite these atrocities, the Sudanese government has often re-
fused to take responsibility for the crimes of murder, rape, and forced 
displacement that continue to be ongoing.45 In a 2005 report, Human 
Rights Watch noted that “[i]nstead of acknowledging state responsibility 
for the scale and gravity of the crimes committed in Darfur, senior Su-
danese officials continue to obfuscate, deny, and evade responsibility for 
the atrocities and scorched earth campaign against civilians in Darfur.”46 
Recent reports acknowledge that the Sudanese government has contin-
ued to participate in large-scale military attacks against civilians, to har-
ass aid workers, and has failed to hold those responsible accountable.47 
Furthermore, the government of Sudan has refused to cooperate with 
the ICC and instead has launched a campaign seeking to protect Presi-
dent Bashir from prosecution.48 In light of the horrific role the gov-
ernment of Sudan has played in the atrocities in Darfur, and its inability 
and refusal to handle the situation domestically, the international com-
munity must respond with a united front to end these crimes.49 
                                                                                                                      
43 See id. Due to the ineffectiveness and shortage of the UNAMID troops and police, it 
is losing the respect of Darfurians. See A Gleam Among the Ruins, supra note 38, at 34. “They 
had hoped that this force, unlike the previous pathetic outfit provided by the African Un-
ion, would finally give them protection from the marauding janjaweed and bandits who kill 
and rape them. They were wrong.” Id. 
44 Save Darfur, supra note 36, at 3–4. From June 2006 to June 2007, attacks against 
humanitarian workers increased 150% and attacks increased again in the beginning of 
2008. Id. In the first nine months of 2008, 170 humanitarian workers were kidnapped or 
abducted and eleven were killed. Save Darfur et al., Rhetoric v. Reality: The Situa-
tion in Darfur 12 (2008), available at http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypa- 
pers/rhetoric_vs_reality_the_situation_in_darfur/. Additionally, between January and Oc-
tober of 2008, 225 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, while in 2007, the number of vehi-
cles hijacked for the entire year had been only 137. Id. 
45 See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 35, at 56–72 (highlighting the gov-
ernment of Sudan’s role in organizing and perpetuating the crimes against civilians com-
mitted in Darfur and offering recommendations to various organizations to end this cy-
cle). The UNAMID took over after U.N. Resolution 1769 which called for “19,555 military 
personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civil-
ian component including up to 3772 police personnel and 19 formed police units com-
prising up to 140 personnel each.” S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 ( July 31, 
2007). 
46 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 35, at 2. 
47 Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 4. 
48 See id. at 5; infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
49 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 35, at 85. 
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II. The Role of the ICC 
A. Formation and Purpose of the ICC Generally 
 Towards the end of the twentieth century and early twenty-first cen-
tury, international criminal law rapidly developed.50 Not least among 
these advancements was the creation of the ICC.51 Understanding the 
history leading up to the creation of this Court is imperative in order to 
grasp its revolutionary role in the international legal community.52 
 Following World War II, the international community demon-
strated its commitment to establishing individual criminal responsibility 
for human rights violations through the creation of the Nuremburg 
and Tokyo tribunals.53 The decades immediately following these tribu-
                                                                                                                      
50 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal 
Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law 63–65 (2004). 
51 See id. at 65. The Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta noted: 
In the long history of the world’s search for international justice and end to 
impunity, there is now a permanent court that promises to hold accountable 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity . . . . For more than 50 years since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, 
the world has failed in bringing to justice those responsible for the millions of 
victims of such horrendous crimes. 
Nuremberg Human Rights Ctr., from Nuremberg to the Hague: The Road to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court 16 (2006), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/From 
NurembergtoHague_07july_eng.pdf. 
52 See infra notes 53–70 and accompanying text. 
53 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 64; Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 182. The Nurem-
berg Tribunals were established to prosecute the Nazis’ crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity. William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court 5–6 (2007). Resulting from these tribunals are the Nuremburg 
Principles which have served as the backbone principles of international criminal law. See 
Broomhall, supra note 50, at 19. “These Principles mark out a doctrinal field establishing 
what was . . . a new relationship between the individual, the State, and the international 
community based on an awareness that national interdependence and industrialized war-
fare created new exigencies and demanded new and stronger safeguards for the stability of 
international life.” Id. The seven Nuremberg Principles are as follows: 
1. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under interna-
tional law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. 
2. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which con-
stitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who 
committed the act from responsibility under international law. 
3. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime un-
der international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government offi-
cial does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. 
4. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a 
superior does not relieve him of responsibility under international law, pro-
vided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. 
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nals, however, witnessed a wavering in the initial attempts to create a 
place of permanent international jurisdiction.54 It was not until the es-
tablishment of the ICTY in 1993, followed a year later by the ICTR, that 
momentum was renewed for establishing jurisdiction for international 
criminal justice.55 These two tribunals were critical to the formation of 
the ICC in providing both legal precedent and a “reassuring model of 
what an international criminal court might look like.”56 
 While the ICTY and the ICTR provided a strong foundation for 
the creation of a permanent international court, the ICC differs from 
these two tribunals in several respects.57 First, the ICC is a treaty-based 
                                                                                                                      
5. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a 
fair trial on the facts and law. 
6. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under interna-
tional law: 
 (a) crimes against peace 
 (b) war crimes 
 (c) crimes against humanity. 
7. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 
crime against humanity, as set forth in principle VI is a crime under interna-
tional law. 
Nuremberg Human Rights Ctr., supra note 51, at 3. In fact, efforts to create an interna-
tional criminal court can be traced back to the nineteenth century, in particular the proposal 
by Gustav-Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, for 
a permanent court to hear crimes committed during the Franco-Prussian War. See Coal. for 
the Int’l Criminal Court, History of the ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
54 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 64. In particular, the Cold War epitomized an at-
mosphere of suspicion that left the enforcement of criminal punishment for war crimes to 
national legal systems which often proved ineffective. See id. In 1948, the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, and they called on the International Law Commission (ILC), a body of experts 
whose job it is to codify and develop international law, to look into the possibility of estab-
lishing an international court to handle the trials of those charged with genocide. See 
Schabas, supra note 53, at 8; Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 53. The ILC 
went so far as to draft such a statute in 1952, but the Cold War resulted in the General 
Assembly abandoning such efforts. See Schabas, supra note 53, at 8–9; Coal. for the Int’l 
Criminal Court, supra note 53. 
55 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 65; Kastner, supra note 3, at 147. Both of these 
courts were created by a Chapter VII Security Council Resolution. See Kastner, supra note 3, 
at 147. The ICTY was established to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991.” Schabas, supra note 53, at 11. Similarly, the ICTR was established to prosecute 
those who committed serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
Rwanda and surrounding countries. See id. The statutes creating the courts are nearly iden-
tical, and they share a prosecutor. See id. at 12. 
56 Schabas, supra note 53, at 13. 
57 See Kastner, supra note 3, at 153. 
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institution.58 On July 17, 1998 the treaty establishing the ICC, the Rome 
Statute, was created.59 This statute required sixty states to ratify or ac-
cede before it would enter into force, which was accomplished on July 
1, 2002.60 The choice to create the ICC by way of a treaty was strategic.61 
In forcing the ICC’s creation to be negotiated and concluded among 
the states, the treaty was meant to enhance the viability and legitimacy 
of the new court and to make it as free as possible from political influ-
ence.62 To make this goal a reality, however, the drafters of the Rome 
Statute had to balance elements that would promote the court’s effec-
tiveness with aspects that would appease the member states and en-
courage ratification.63 
 Despite attempting to appease the state actors, the court remains 
independent and its judges are not subject to any external authority.64 
The Security Council’s role in the ICC is two-fold: under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, it may request the prosecutor to ini-
tiate proceedings, but may not influence the results of those proceed-
ings.65 Furthermore, it may delay a proceeding or prosecution of the 
court for a period of twelve months which is subject to renewal.66 
 Due to the interest in keeping the ICC politically neutral, the crea-
tion of this latter deferral provision, under Article 16 of the Rome Stat-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 67; Kastner, supra note 3, at 153. 
59 See Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 6, at 2. The Rome Statute was 
created during a meeting of 160 countries at the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court which took place from 
June 15–July 17, 1998. See id. The basis for the treaty came from a draft statute submitted 
by the ILC to the U.N. General Assembly in 1994. See id. 
60 See Schabas, supra note 53, at 19. States were first given a deadline of December 31, 
2000, to sign the Statute as an indication that they intended to ratify the Statute. Id. Those 
states that did not meet this initial signature deadline, but subsequently wished to join the 
court, are considered to have acceded to, rather than ratified, the Statute. Id. The delay 
taken by many states from the time that they signed to the time of ratification was normal 
given the vast legislative changes that many states needed to make in order to comply with 
the mandates of the Statute. Id. at 20. 
61 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 67–68; Kastner, supra note 3, at 153. 
62 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 67–68; Nuremberg Human Rights Ctr., supra 
note 51, at 11; Kastner, supra note 3, at 153. 
63 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 68. For example, the statute gives the court inher-
ent jurisdiction (Article 12(1)) while requiring deferral to national proceedings (Article 
18). See id. 
64 See Nuremberg Human Rights Ctr., supra note 51, at 11. The ICC, while inde-
pendent, is linked to the U.N. through a Cooperation Agreement and an Agreement on 
Immunities. See id. The Assembly of States Parties has responsibility for governing the 
court. See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 53. 
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ute, was highly controversial.67 Those that opposed the provision saw it 
as weakening the impartiality and independence of the court.68 It was 
equally recognized, however, that there are times when the sensitivity of 
conflicts will require decisions about the wisdom of a criminal prosecu-
tion.69 This debate is at the forefront of the current controversy over 
the ICC’s role in Sudan.70 
 The ICC is also unique in that it has no official enforcement body.71 
Therefore, the court must rely on the states that ratified the Rome 
Treaty for support in order to make the court effective.72 This further 
encourages dialogue among the participating states in support of the 
court’s goals.73 
 Ultimately, the ICC was established to end impunity for the most 
serious transgressions against human rights and to continue to work to 
prevent these crimes from occurring.74 With the cooperation of the 
member States, the court will have the potential to do just that.75 As 
stated by Bruce Broomhall: 
The International Criminal Court must ultimately be the 
foundation stone of any claim that international criminal law 
is moving towards effective enforcement, that is, towards the 
rule of law. Only the ICC will have the jurisdictional reach as 
well as the potential resources and legitimacy to secure, with 
any regularity, a meaningful degree of accountability for the 
politically sensitive and politically motivated crimes that lie at 
the heart of the Rome Statute.76 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Schabas, supra note 53, at 82. 
68 See id. Despite these objections, the final provision was an improvement from the 
original drafted provision initially suggested by the ILC. See id. at 82. The original provision 
would have allowed a single member state to halt prosecution. Id. This would have only be 
overridden by a resolution of the Council which itself is subject to veto power by one of the 
five permanent members. See id. 
69 See Schabas, supra note 53, at 82. 
70 See infra notes 116–119 and accompanying text. 
71 See Kastner, supra note 3, at 153. 
72 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 151. Once a warrant for arrest has been issued, the 
state concerned is required to take immediate steps to arrest the person and surrender 
them to the court. See Schabas, supra note 53, at 132. One hundred and eight govern-
ments have ratified the Rome Treaty. See A Warrant for Bashir, Economist, May 7, 2009, at 
20. Conspicuously absent from this list are the United States, Russia, and China. See id. 
73 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 151. 
74 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 215, 215–16 (2008). 
75 See id. at 224. 
76 Broomhall, supra note 50, at 67. 
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B. ICC Involvement in Darfur 
 The ICC became involved in the situation in Darfur on March 31, 
2005 when the U.N. Security Council referred the situation to the court 
through Resolution 1593.77 The ICC then issued its first two warrants in 
April 2007.78 The first warrant was for government minister Ahmad Ha-
run and the second was for the Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb.79 These 
two are accused of “individual responsibility for fifty-one counts of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, forcible 
transfer of population, rape, persecution, torture, and outrages upon 
personal dignity, among others.”80 Neither suspect has been handed 
over by the Sudanese government.81 In a second affront to the ICC, the 
government announced that Harun was promoted to State Minister for 
Humanitarian Affairs and would co-chair a committee to adjudicate 
human rights violations in Darfur.82 Both of these men have yet to be 
arrested.83 
 On July 14, 2008, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo issued a 
warrant request for Sudanese President Omar Bashir.84 This is the first 
time that the ICC has pursued a sitting head of state.85 President Bashir 
has been charged with ten counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
                                                                                                                      
77 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 35, at 84. The U.N. Security Council author-
ized six resolutions that dealt with Sudan between July 2004 and March 2005. See id. at 84 
n.249. Resolutions 1574 (November 2004) and 1590 (March 2005) dealt mainly with the 
north-south peace agreement and mentioned Darfur only in passing. Id. The resolutions 
that specifically dealt with Darfur were Resolutions 1556 ( July 2006), which called for the 
Sudanese government to disarm and punish the Janjaweed militias, 1564 (September 
2004), 1591 and 1593 (March 2005). Id. The referral by the Security Council came as a 
shock to the Sudanese government who expected that Security Council allies, including 
China, Russia, and Algeria, would veto the move. See id. at 84–85. 
78 See Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 1. 
79 See id. 
80 See Save Darfur, supra note 36, at 12. 
81 See id.; Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 1. 
82 See Save Darfur, supra note 36, at 12. The Sudanese government also announced 
that the notorious Janjaweed leader, Musa Hillal, would serve as special advisor on tribal 
affairs to the President. See id. Hillal is already subject to a U.N.-mandated travel ban, and 
he is considered to be one of the most egregious offenders in North Darfur since 2003. See 
id. 
83 See Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13. 
84 See Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 5. 
85 Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and 
Charles Taylor of Liberia were both presidents when they were first charged with war 
crimes, but they faced other international tribunals. See id. 
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and war crimes.86 This indictment also marks the first time that the 
court has sought an indictment for genocide.87 In response to the re-
quest for a warrant, the Sudanese government launched a campaign to 
postpone the indictment, coupled with threats of future violence if the 
warrant was issued.88 In a statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on December 3, 2008, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo noted these 
threats made by Sudanese government officials: 
In response to the Application, Sudanese Presidential Advisor 
Bona Malwal said on 25 July: “We are telling the world that with 
the indictment of our president Al-Bashir we cannot be responsible for 
the well-being of foreign forces in Darfur”; Adam Hamid Musa, re-
cent governor of South Darfur, threatened that there will be 
“more genocide like it has been not seen before by anyone”, if Presi-
dent Al Bashir is indicted; and President Al Bashir himself 
said that “we are not looking for problems, but if they come to us then 
we will teach them a lesson they won’t forget.”89 
 In addition, in September 2008, the Sudanese government pro-
vided a progress report to the Commission of the African Union claim-
ing that there had been improvements in Darfur and that the govern-
ment would continue to strive for peace in the country.90 As the insecu-
rity in Darfur and the government’s unwillingness to punish those 
responsible for these crimes continues, these claims have proven to be 
little more than propaganda.91 
 Despite these threats, the ICC continued its mission of promoting 
justice and eliminating impunity by officially issuing an arrest warrant 
for President Bashir on March 4, 2009, charging him with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.92 The Sudanese government continued 
its resistance of the Court by summoning several humanitarian organi-
                                                                                                                      
86 Press Release, United Nations, Conference on Developments Relating to Interna-
tional Criminal Court Investigation in Darfur, Role of Security Council (Sept. 19, 2008), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080919_ICC.doc.htm. 
87 Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. Until this point, only the United States 
has referred to the atrocities in Darfur directly as genocide. See id. 
88 See Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 5. 
89 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, International Criminal Court, Statement to the 
United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Pursu-
ant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 3 (2008). 
90 See Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 5. 
91 See id. at 5–6 (highlighting the differences between the claims that the Sudanese 
government makes regarding improvements in the country as compared with the reality of 
the situation). 
92 See Simons & MacFarquhar, supra note 13. 
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zations to a meeting almost immediately after the warrant was an-
nounced and ordering them to leave the country or curb their work.93 
The Sudanese ambassador to the U.N. declared that the government 
would no longer work with aid groups that it deemed hostile and re-
jected the ICC’s prosecution saying, “We strongly condemn this crimi-
nal move. . . . It amounts to an attempt at regime change. We are not 
going to be bound by it.”94 
 The Sudanese government is seeking to convince the U.N. Secu-
rity Council to invoke its power under Article 16 of the Rome Treaty to 
suspend any investigation or prosecution.95 This is the first time that 
the Security Council has faced this decision.96 Prior to the issuance of 
the arrest warrant, the five permanent members of the Security Council 
(Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) expressed a de-
sire to wait and see if Sudan would change its course of action before 
making a decision about whether or not to delay prosecution.97 Now 
that the arrest warrant has been issued, however, there is speculation 
that France, Britain, or the United States would veto a decision to post-
pone prosecution.98 
 So far, extreme threats of violence have not played out in the mag-
nitude promised by the Sudanese government officials.99 Street dem-
onstrations in support of President Bashir and the exile of needed hu-
manitarian aid groups are the only manifestations of these threats thus 
far.100 The government continues to deny the charges brought against 
their leaders and have rebuffed the court.101 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. 
94 Id. President Bashir has also denied all accusations. See Braced for the Aftershock, supra 
note 15, at 66. “He told his critics . . . to dissolve their accusations in water and drink 
them.” See id. Amidst these public claims of denouncing the court, however, the govern-
ment has shown some acceptance of the fact that they are likely going to have to engage 
with the court and have hired the British law firm Eversheds LLP to examine the charges 
and help with his prosecution. See A Middle Way for Justice in Sudan, Economist, Dec. 13, 
2008, at 68. 
95 See Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 5; Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, 
at 55. The report claimed that the government had “‘cooperated without reservation with 
the AU, U.N. and International community in their collective efforts to achieve peace and 
stability in Darfur.’” Save Darfur et al., supra note 44, at 5. 
96 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
97 See id. 
98 See Simons & MacFacquhar, supra note 13. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
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III. Need for the ICC in Darfur 
 The ICC is desperately needed in Darfur given the failure of the 
Sudanese government to prosecute those responsible for these 
crimes.102 One of the foundations of the Rome Statute is the idea of 
“complementarity.”103 This concept provides an opportunity for states 
to take on the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes 
committed in their own borders, through the use of their domestic 
courts.104 According to this principle, the ICC will only assert jurisdic-
tion over a case when it concludes that the national courts are “‘unwill-
ing or unable to prosecute’” on their own.105 While the application of 
complementarity in the case of a U.N. Security Council referral is 
somewhat vague, the idea behind the principle is that international 
criminal justice will be most successful when international prosecutions 
are avoided because of effectively functioning domestic courts.106 
 Although it would be ideal to have the Sudanese government cre-
ate fair and efficient domestic courts in order to avoid often cited pit-
falls of purely international justice systems, the Sudanese government 
has shown that this has not, and likely will never, happen.107 The report 
from the government of Sudan to the African Union and U.N. on Sep-
                                                                                                                      
102 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 89, at 5; More Than 100 to Face Sham Courts in Su-
dan, supra note 21; Human Rights Watch, supra note 21. 
103 See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 86; Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 89, at 5. 
104 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 89, at 5. 
105 See Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 199. The idea of complementarity was overwhelm-
ingly supported at the creation of the Rome Statute. See Broomhall, supra note 50, at 86. 
This not only works to ensure that the ICC will not supersede national courts, but also 
“[b]ecause the Court has the power to make the final decisions on the admissibility of 
cases before it, States that wish to avoid the adverse attention, the diplomatic entangle-
ments, the duty to cooperate and other consequences of ICC activity have a real incentive 
to take action against crimes under the Statute.” Id. at 86. While the ICC could agree to 
hand over the prosecution of President Bashir and others, it will only do this if the judges 
of the ICC are convinced that a special or hybrid court would be as strict and as fair in its 
application of justice, a very high hurdle for Sudan to overcome. See A Middle Way for Justice 
in Sudan, supra note 94, at 69. 
106 See Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 200, 202–03. Sudan’s most prominent opposition 
politician, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has suggested creating independent hybrid courts that would 
have both Sudanese and international judges. See A Middle Way for Justice in Sudan, supra 
note 94, at 68. Such courts have been set up by the U.N. and also by those countries con-
cerned with Sierra Leone and Cambodia. See id. 
107 Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 89, at 5; Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 193, 202. Some 
of the problems that have been cited with purely international processes include failure to 
adequately promote local building capacity, difficulties in overcoming problems of per-
ceived legitimacy, failure to promote reconciliation in the country where the crimes were 
committed, and inability to apprehend the major perpetrators. Lipscomb, supra note 27, at 
193–94. 
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tember 17, 2008 stated that over the last five years, the Sudanese do-
mestic court system has only tried and completed seven cases and these 
had no connection to crimes by Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb, or Presi-
dent Bashir.108 Furthermore, the courts that do exist have been criti-
cized as being hastily created and inherently unfair.109 Georgette 
Gagnon, the Africa director at Human Rights Watch stated that, “The 
special courts set up by Sudan to try alleged rebels who attacked [Su-
dan’s capital] Khartoum are a charade. The special courts don’t meet 
even minimal fair trial standards, and yet they have the power to sen-
tence people to death.”110 
 The failure of Sudan’s justice system has caused Darfur to “become 
a byword for impunity, a wilderness of atrocity and crime, and probably 
the world’s worst humanitarian disaster.”111 For any chance to truly re-
store peace to the region, the perpetrators of these crimes must be 
brought to justice.112 “[T]he ICC appears to be the most credible insti-
tution to hear the Darfur story, given its ‘entirely international compo-
sition and a set of well-defined rules of procedure and evidence.’”113 
Other options for dealing with the atrocities that do not involve the 
ICC, such as hybrid tribunals or a Special Court like the one created 
during Sierra Leone’s civil war, are not well suited to the current con-
flict in Darfur.114 As noted by Human Rights Watch: 
As a permanent international court with a mandate to prose-
cute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when 
national courts are unable or unwilling to do so, the ICC was 
created to address exactly the type of situation in Darfur. Al-
though prosecuting widespread atrocities would present chal-
lenges for any international or internationalized criminal tri-
                                                                                                                      
108 Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 89, at 5. The most severe of the crimes that were 
prosecuted was the case of a student killed during a demonstration. See id. 
109 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 21. 
110 See id. 
111 See Udombana, supra note 5, at 5. 
112 See id. at 19–20. 
113 Id. at 20 (quoting International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the In-
ternational Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, ¶ 648 ( Jan. 25, 2005)). 
114 See id. at 10–11. Charles Taylor, Liberia’s former president who has been charged as 
responsible for grave crimes against humanity during Sierra Leone’s civil war is facing 
prosecution by a hybrid tribunal. See id. His case has been before the Special Court since 
2003, but the court has yet to complete a single case or hand down a conviction. See id. at 
11. The court is now facing financial problems due to the fact that it was not created under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter making it a donor-driven institution as opposed to funded 
by the contributions of the member states. See id. at 10–11. 
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bunal, the ICC is preferable to other alternatives. National 
prosecutions are not viable. . . . [and a] new ad hoc interna-
tional or national-international tribunal would take too long to 
establish.115 
IV. Peace Versus Justice: Deciding Whether to Invoke Article 16 
 The debate over whether or not the U.N. Security Council should 
invoke its power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute has brought up 
the well-known debate in the international community between peace 
versus justice.116 Those advocating peace argue that arresting the sitting 
head of state will only cause more bloodshed and ruin any chance for 
peace negotiations.117 Conversely, others fear that giving in to the Presi-
dent’s blackmail will undermine the ICC’s credibility and crush any 
hope of deterring other tyrants.118 While there are certainly sensitive 
political issues to consider, by referring this case to the ICC, the U.N. 
showed its trust in the ability of the court to take appropriate steps, and 
they must now support the court in fulfilling that obligation.119 
A. Importance of the Referral to the ICC 
 The initial referral of the investigation of the humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur to the ICC was the first step in legitimizing the fledgling court 
and showed the world that the international community will no longer 
accept such atrocious crimes.120 The U.N. additionally acknowledged 
                                                                                                                      
115 Human Rights Watch, US: ICC Best Chance for Justice in Darfur, Hum. Rts. Watch 
News, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/01/21/us-icc-best-chance-justice-
darfur. 
116 See Sudan’s Leader Is Accused, supra note 10, at 55. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See A Warrant for Bashir, supra note 72, at 20. 
120 See Udombana, supra note 5, at 21–22. The referral came under Resolution 1593; 
eleven countries voted for the Resolution, none voted against it, and four countries—
Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States—abstained. See Coal. for the Int’l Criminal 
Court, Res. 1593, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=res1593 (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). It has 
been argued that with the Security Council’s referral, “the ICC made an important move 
from academic exercise to legal reality.” Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral 
of the Crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: 
Implications for the International Criminal Court’s Functions and Status, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 
650, 650 (2006). Much has also been noted about the United States’ decision to abstain 
from voting. See id.; Udombana, supra note 5, at 9–11. The United States had argued that 
they did not believe that a referral to the ICC was the best step to take with the situation in 
Darfur. See Udombana, supra note 5, at 9. Despite this, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. 
noted that “it was important that the international community spoke with one voice in 
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the role that the ICC would play in promoting international justice and 
indicated that it was intended to complement the role of the Security 
Council.121 By allowing the referral to go through, the international 
community set forth that consistency and fairness will dominate the 
international community’s approach to such atrocities.122 Finally, in 
making the referral the U.N. Security Council placed its confidence 
and trust in the ICC, and recognized that in order to achieve peace, 
there must be justice.123 In fact, a failure to have referred the crisis to 
the ICC would have begged the question as to whether the Court would 
ever be able to exercise its jurisdiction over cases other than ones where 
states themselves had consented.124 
 Especially in light of the importance of its decision to make a re-
ferral to the ICC, the U.N. Security Council must continue the support 
it has granted to the Court or else potentially hurt the credence it has 
given it up to this point.125 
B. Fears of Promoting the Prosecution of President Bashir 
 Discussions concerning the continued prosecution of President 
Bashir highlight two reoccurring fears regarding a decision not to defer 
the case.126 The first is the fear that there will be more bloodshed in the 
country, putting human rights workers even more at risk.127 The sec-
ond fear is that once Bashir is arrested, the international community 
                                                                                                                      
order to help promote effective accountability.” See id. at 10. While some have seen the 
referral to the court as a breakthrough, based on the United States’ position, others note 
that the abstention of the United States weakens the credibility and power of the ICC. See 
Heyder, supra, at 650. While the referral procedure had been seen as one of the most im-
portant facets of the Rome Treaty during the negotiations surrounding its drafting, it 
seemed to present a huge obstacle during discussion of the crisis in Darfur. See id. at 652. 
121 See Udombana, supra note 5, at 18. It is also important that the crimes committed in 
Darfur clearly fell within the mandate of the court. See Heyder, supra note 120, at 653. “The 
global community faced horrific crimes against humanity and war crimes, that qualified as 
genocide according to the United States, while the state in whose territory the crimes were 
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will lose all bargaining power for further peace negotiations with Su-
dan.128 These fears, however, suggest that justice is somehow mutually 
exclusive from peace.129 
 The fear of more bloodshed is not unfounded.130 The reaction of 
many in Sudan to the possibility of an arrest warrant for President 
Bashir certainly gave cause for concern.131 The ruling National Con-
gress Party in Sudan called the case against the President “irresponsible 
cheap political blackmail” and further warned that there would be 
“more violence and blood” if the arrest warrant were actually issued.132 
Outside of a meeting between President Bashir and his cabinet mem-
bers soon after the possibility of an arrest warrant became public, hun-
dreds of Sudanese congregated to protest any arrest of their Presi-
dent.133 In response to threats of future violence, Shereen Zorba, dep-
uty UNAMID spokesperson, commented that this might require the 
temporary relocation of foreign staff working on humanitarian relief 
operations.134 She further lamented that “[t]he people of Darfur have 
already suffered unimaginable suffering and should not be subjected to 
more tragedy,” which could be the result of disruption in humanitarian 
operations.135 
 Some of these fears came to fruition when the court announced 
that it would indeed indict the President and issued a warrant for his 
arrest.136 Agencies estimated to be providing fifty to seventy percent of 
the total humanitarian assistance to Darfur—such as food, water, and 
medical care—have had their licenses to operate revoked and have 
been told to leave.137 This departure will have a catastrophic effect on 
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more than a million people in the region.138 This depravation of neces-
sary aid by the government may in itself be a violation of international 
humanitarian law in the unlawful reprisal or collective punishment.139 
 Despite these problems which must now be addressed, however, 
the violence in Darfur continues and remains a serious matter that 
needs not only attention and humanitarian aid, but action.140 Adding 
legitimacy to the decision to issue a warrant for the sitting President 
Bashir, the ICC Head Prosecutor has not taken this decision lightly.141 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo was public about the fact that he was in-
vestigating the activities of President Bashir in an effort to force him to 
cooperate.142 Additionally, the Prosecutor was equally as public about 
his request for an arrest warrant, when he could have applied for a 
sealed warrant.143 According to an editorial in The Economist, had Presi-
dent Bashir “reined in the attacks, cooperated better with peacekeepers 
and the court and tried peacemaking, he might have wriggled off the 
ICC hook. He didn’t bother.”144 With the credibility of the ICC on the 
line, and the failure of other efforts to thwart the humanitarian crisis 
going on in the country, no better option exists than the continued 
prosecution of President Bashir.145 
 Concerns about the loss of peace negotiations are yet another 
component of the debate about the proper role of the ICC in Sudan.146 
Some are concerned that an indictment will derail the peace negotia-
tions of 2005 that addressed the long civil war between northern and 
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southern Sudan.147 Additionally, some worry that indicting President 
Bashir could end any hope of a peaceful negotiation in Darfur.148 In 
suggesting both potential problems, the Sudanese Ambassador Abdal-
mahmood Abdalhaleem stated, “We condemn this indictment against 
our head of state. This is an affront to the president and the whole na-
tion. It will have bad, destabilizing and negative consequences for the 
peace process for Darfur and Sudan at large.”149 
 The north-south peace process, while a step in the right direction 
for the country, has been fraught with the same stagnation and help-
lessness seen in Darfur.150 In the agreement, the two sides agreed to 
“share the wealth, integrate the two sides’ armies and settle the bound-
ary between them.”151 While designed to create a unified, harmonious 
New Sudan, neither side has invested in promoting the attractiveness of 
this unification as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement demands.152 In 
fact, the agreement gives southerners the right to secede from Sudan in 
2011 following a referendum, and many southerners are considering 
such an action.153 Given the condition of the agreement now, deferring 
the indictment of President Bashir will likely only continue the stale-
mate.154 Furthermore, in the case of two other heads of state taken to 
court—Liberia’s Charles Taylor and Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic— 
fears that prosecuting these leaders would dismantle peace efforts 
proved unfounded.155 
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 While amnesty has been used as a tool in peace negotiations, 
President Bashir has shown an unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC 
in any capacity.156 Given the response of President Bashir thus far, al-
lowing him impunity for his actions at this point would be a “get out of 
jail free card.”157 One Senior Security Council diplomat explained that 
President Bashir might have had the necessary votes to get the indict-
ment against him deferred if he “had put as much effort into peace in 
Darfur as he is alleged to have put into directing atrocities.”158 At one 
point, there was hope that “the stick of indictment and carrot of sus-
pension” would entice President Bashir to mend his ways, but that did 
not happen.159 At this point, there is a real fear that deferring the 
prosecution any longer will create a return to a “climate of impu-
nity.”160 Richard Dicker, the Director of the International Justice Pro-
gram at Human Rights Watch aptly notes that: 
[i]f the UN were to decide that it would allow a Government 
to bully it into silence in confining its own human rights re-
porting and what it did with that information, I think that 
would be a huge step back for the UN, its commitment to 
human rights, and its credibility.161 
C. Reasons for Supporting the Indictment and Continued Prosecution 
 While there are certainly serious issues to consider in moving for-
ward with the prosecution of President Bashir, ultimately, justice must 
be served.162 If this process does not move forward, the impunity of key 
perpetrators in Darfur will signal to the world that government sanc-
tioned crimes against humanity in the context of genocide are toler-
ated by the international community.163 Far from rushing through a 
decision of indictment, the Prosecutor and the ICC have taken the time 
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to thoroughly investigate the conflict in Darfur before making a deci-
sion.164 The stakes for the fledgling ICC, and international justice as a 
whole, are very high.165 The prosecution of President Bashir is a crucial 
step in legitimizing the role of the ICC, providing deterrence for future 
world leaders, and honoring the victims of these atrocities.166 
 The ICC has the capability not only to render justice in this spe-
cific case in Darfur, but also to heighten deterrence through the impo-
sition of international criminal justice.167 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
noted that “one case in the court reverberates in the world. . . . This 
court is not just a system to punish, it establishes the law. So, one case in 
the court makes the reality in the world.”168 Unlike other temporary ad 
hoc tribunals, the permanent nature of the court makes it a lasting 
threat to those who perpetrate human rights abuses.169 “Because the 
ICC functions as a court of last resort and exercises a direct influence 
on national systems to act, it is realistic to believe that its mere presence 
will augment the number of national prosecutions in the future, and 
thus increase the long-term potential for global deterrence.”170 
 However, while this potential deterrence is great, the court’s power 
to influence other leaders could be drastically undermined by a deci-
sion to defer prosecution of President Bashir in light of his threats and 
acts of retaliation.171 The legitimacy of an international criminal court 
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is imperative in seeking to solve these humanitarian conflicts and the 
international community must uphold the law to preserve this.172 
 While the court should consider the effect that retaliation by the 
government of Sudan could have on the victims of Darfur, failing to 
seek the prosecution of those responsible for the crimes will serve only 
to further demoralize these victims.173 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has 
made it clear that his priority is to protect African victims.174 If the ICC 
and U.N. Security Council allow the government of Sudan “to use 
threats of additional violence and further crimes to defer or even dispel 
the possibility of justice, the victims of Darfur are ultimately be-
trayed.”175 The decision of the Sudanese government to expel aid 
workers is itself a violation of international law.176 This is certainly a 
devastating problem that the U.N. must work to reverse, but these cruel 
and inhumane tactics should not be a reason to delay prosecuting the 
man responsible for such atrocities.177 These victims certainly should 
not be made to suffer any more than they already have, but delaying 
prosecution is not the solution to that problem.178 
 While the ICC has made it clear that they are ready to proceed 
with the prosecution of President Bashir, it will take the support of the 
entire international community, and in particular the U.N., in order to 
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achieve this goal.179 The 108 governments that have ratified the Rome 
Treaty are obligated to try and bring President Bashir to justice.180 
There are however, members of the Security Council that have not rati-
fied the Rome Statute, including the United States, China, and Rus-
sia.181 While these countries have the power under Article 16 to post-
pone the prosecution, they have no legal obligation to seek his ar-
rest.182 In order for the prosecution of President Bashir to be 
successful, there must be widespread support for the Court.183 This 
must include the powerful countries that are members of the U.N. but 
have not ratified the Rome Treaty.184 The U.N. first referred the matter 
to the ICC, and now must back the arrest warrant and continued 
prosecution of President Bashir.185 
 Pursuing justice in Darfur through the immediate prosecution of 
those responsible, particularly President Bashir, is essential for ultimate 
peace in Sudan, and for the kind of permanent international justice the 
ICC represents.186 While the government’s expulsion of vital humanitar-
ian aid workers is a potentially catastrophic backlash, President Bashir 
has had more than enough time to mend his ways and avoid a potential 
indictment.187 Allowing him to go free now would be a message to the 
world that the ICC can be bullied by tyrannical threats.188 The U.N. and 
the international community as a whole must work together to appre-
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hend President Bashir, and force him to face the ICC for the atrocities 
he orchestrated.189 While concerns about peace versus justice dominate 
the debate over what to do in Sudan, the reality is that there can be no 
enduring peace in the region until justice is done.190 The only way to 
ensure justice is for the international community to support the ICC in 
its pursuit of holding President Bashir accountable.191 
Conclusion 
 The crisis in Darfur is one of the most pressing concerns of the 
international community. The government of Sudan has supported 
and orchestrated years of mass murder, rape, and the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of Darfurians. In particular, the sitting Presi-
dent Bashir has had direct involvement in these crimes. 
 Despite the ICC’s clear acknowledgment of the role President 
Bashir has played, the international community is now caught in a de-
bate about whether or not to go forward with the prosecution. Some 
argue that the U.N. Security Council should invoke their power under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute and delay an indictment in an effort to 
prevent a potentially violent retaliation on the part of the Sudanese 
government. While there is reason for concern over the threats of Su-
dan’s government and its decision to expel needed humanitarian aid 
organizations from the country, President Bashir must be held imme-
diately accountable to ensure lasting peace in the country. 
 Furthermore, the creation of ICC is one of the most significant 
accomplishments in international criminal justice and its legitimacy 
and future power of deterrence rest on the prosecution of those re-
sponsible in Sudan. Delaying the prosecution sends the message to fu-
ture tyrannical leaders that the court can be bullied into delaying an 
indictment through violence and threats. Sudan’s retaliation tactics 
should not be reason to grant President Bashir leeway, but rather 
should bolster the argument for seeking immediate justice. 
 In order to accomplish the justice that the victims of Darfur de-
serve, the U.N. Security Council must not delay the prosecution of 
President Bashir any longer, but must instead support the ICC in appre-
hending the sitting president. The entire international community and 
the future of international criminal justice depend on this decision. 
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